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1974

Book Reviews

Undeclared War and Civil Disobedience: The
American System in Crisis. By Lawrence
R. Velvel. (New York: The Dunellen Co.,
1970. Pp. xvii, 405. $8.95.)
Undeclared War and Civil Disobedience predates even the Cambodian incursion of spring,
1970. Mr. Velvel's concerns, however, were
old before the United States went to war in
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Indochina. He focuses on four dilemmas: the
constitutional allocation of control between the
president and Congress over the initiation of
American involvement in hostilities; the proper
role of the courts in determining that allocation; the validity of civil disobedience as a
means of shaping government policy; and the
possibility of institutional legislation to prevent
American war-making unless authorized by
Congress.
Aside from presidential response to sudden
attack on American lives or property, Mr.
Velvel reads the Constitution to require prior
congressional approval for "armed force
against another nation or . . . group within
another nation," given a "reasonable possibility that any degree of combat" will result
"within the near future" ( p. 106). To avoid
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive, Congress must specify
"clear upper limits" on the kinds and sizes of
the forces that may be used, the kinds of
weapons, geographic areas of operations, objectives, and lengths of time that military actions may continue (p. 97).
Mr. Velvel would swing wide the courthouse door to citizen attacks on the legality
of government action, especially executive involvement of the country in conflict. The author stresses a "clear distinction between the
judicial question of whether the President may
constitutionally fight an undeclared war and
the political question of whether or not we
should fight the war" ( p. 134) .
Buttressed by intricate criteria for distinguishing good protestors from bad, and by
belief that America historically depends on
protest as catalyst for reform, Mr. Velvel argues that "there are times when civil disobedience should be permitted as a means for
obtaining constructive change" (p. 215). To
encourage desired disobedience, he would have
juries acquit good protestors even though they
violated constitutional laws. Failing jury nullification of the law, he calls for sentences responsive to whether the protestor harmed persons or property and to "the need to mediate
between the goal of punishing people heavily
enough to deter them from violating the law
and the goal of not punishing them so heavily
that they could never risk violating the law no
matter how just their cause or how fine their
records" (p. 248).
Finally, Mr. Velvel seeks "an institutional
method of insuring that at the very moment
when war may occur, Congress will be forced
to make a clear decision on whether to fight"
(p. 256). His solution is legislation blocking
I
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all funds for American involvement in combat until Congress authorizes it, except for executive response to sudden attack.
A theme recurrent through the four parts of
Undeclared War and Civil Disobedience is the
American system in crisis: the rule of law
beset by executive usurpation, while Congress
and the courts stand cravenly by, and citizens
struggling for constitutionality are savaged. The
rich development of this theme, in fact, is the
book's most distinguished characteristic. Mr.
Velvel captures the constitutional angst caused
mainly by Vietnam and ensuing domestic ills.
Satisfying analysis of the dilemmas at hand
is another matter. Although insight and sound
argument are often present, the scope of the
effort prevents thorough inquiry into the
book's four concerns; vital problems go begging-for example, the possibility that American use of force may be in the national interest and only the president willing to act, as
before World War II. Reliance on social and
political salvation through judicial action is
pushed beyond the bounds of the practical or
desirable, a reflection perhaps of Mr. Velvel's
battles in court against the war. His reasoning
can be weak, for instance, misapprehension of
the legal concept of neutral principles (pp. 186,
331). His use of history can be suspect; for
example, he is "not at all sure that the Congressmen who didn't want to fight in World
War I were wrong. One can make a pretty
decent argument that without our entry into
the war, it might have ended in a stalemate
rather than in a situation which led to the
rise of Hitler . . . and Communism in Russia"
(p. 293).
Finally, Mr. Velvel takes on "the problem
of how to prevent people in power from doing
evil and how to force them to do good" (p.
253), under the imperative "of a certain distaste, not to say loathing, for what has occurred as a result of Vietnam" (pp. 9-10).
Like St. George with the dragon, he wields a
righteous blade. Cleft, for instance, are Lyndon
Johnson, the "paradigm" of a man with "the
most malign, even the most vicious, ideas"
(p. 86); "the antiquarian and unthinking defenders of everything past who currently occupy too many of our judicial posts" (p. 113);
the "classic imbecility and utter impracticality"
of Frankfurter's view that malapportioned
voters should seek legislative relief (p. 114);
"red-neck Congressmen who hate the progressive ideas which demonstrators are fighting
for" (p. 119); "the often stupid legal doctrine
of mootness" (p. 143); the "Neanderthally
stupid" use of the concept of standing to block
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cases involving injury to the general public
(p. 160); the "highly debatable" if not "abominably stupid" objection to distinguishing between good and bad demonstrators on the
basis of the values they espouse ( p. 188) ; and
"aged rural bunglers and bigots and pork barrelers" promoted by the congressional seniority
system (p. 265). The sound of such falling
dragons enlivens the text but steadily signals its
skew as well.
Footnotes come in three kinds, all separately
presented in the back of the book. There is
neither table of cases nor index. Thus the way
is not easy, nor the burden light for the reader
once he leaves the text. Perhaps unified footnotes, a table of cases, and index fell victim
to rapid publication, so that Americans
"[a]rmed with the arsenal of arguments arrayed in Undeclared War and Civil Disobedience" could "force their government . . . to
end its lawlessness, to cease the senseless
slaughter," in the words of the book's sponsor, the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam (p. vi).
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